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OPINION 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Darwin Lesher filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that debt-collection letters he received from the Law 
Offices of Mitchell N. Kay (the “Kay Law Firm”) were 
deceptive under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the 
“FDCPA” or the “Act”).  The District Court agreed and 
granted Lesher‟s motion for summary judgment.  The Kay 
Law Firm now appeals from the District Court‟s order.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
 
I.  Background 
The Kay Law Firm is a law firm that acts as a debt 
collector.  On January 11, 2009, the Kay Law Firm sent a 
letter to Lesher seeking to recover a debt he owed to 
Washington Mutual on a home equity loan.  The letter was 
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presented on the Kay Law Firm‟s letterhead, which displays 
the words “Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C.” in large 
characters at the top of the page.  (A040.)  The letter, after 
referencing Lesher‟s account with Washington Mutual, states 
as follows: 
 
Please be advised that your account, as 
referenced above, is being handled by this 
office.  
 
We have been authorized to offer you the 
opportunity to settle this account with a lump 
sum payment, equal to 75% of the balance 
due—which is $9,080.52! 
 
Unless you notify this office within 30 days 
after receiving this notice that you dispute the 
validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this 
office will assume this debt is valid.  
 
If you notify this office in writing within 30 
days from receiving this notice that you dispute 
the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, 
this office will: Obtain verification of the debt 
or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a 
copy of such judgment or verification. 
 
If you request this office in writing within 30 
days after receiving this notice, this office will 
provide you with the name and address of the 
original creditor, if different from the current 
creditor.  
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You are invited to visit our website 
www.lawofmnk.com to resolve this debt 
privately, or to write to us or to update your 
personal information.   
 
(Id.)
1
  After a large blank space, the letter directs Lesher to 
“PLEASE ADDRESS ALL PAYMENTS TO” the “Law 
Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C.” at their New York address.  
(Id.)  Immediately below the address, the letter states: 
“Notice: Please see reverse side for important information.”  
(Id.)  A box surrounds this notice, below which is a 
detachable payment stub.  
 
On the back, the letter sets forth four “notices,” 
including the following two: 
 
This communication is from a debt collector 
and is an attempt to collect a debt.  Any 
information obtained will be used for that 
purpose. 
 
At this point in time, no attorney with this firm 
has personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.  
 
(A041.)
2
   
                                              
1
  Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the letter are the disclosures 
required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3), (4), and (5).   
 
2
  The other two notices inform the recipient that: (1) if he is 
entitled to protection under the United States Bankruptcy 
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 On February 15, 2009, the Kay Law Firm sent a 
second letter to Lesher.  This letter was not printed on the 
same letterhead, but instead stated in smaller characters at the 
top that it was from the “Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, 
P.C.”  (A042.)  The letter offers the choice of a six-month 
repayment plan or a settlement, and again instructs the reader 
to “see reverse side for important information.”  (Id.)  The 
back of the letter sets forth the same disclaimers as the first 
letter.  (A043.) 
 
 In March 2009, shortly after receiving these letters, 
Lesher filed a complaint in the District Court against the Kay 
Law Firm.  In the complaint, Lesher alleged that the letters 
violated, inter alia, section 1692e of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 
1692e (1996), by misleading him to believe that an attorney 
was involved in collecting his debt, and that the attorney 
could, and would, take legal action against him.
3 
 
                                                                                                     
Code, the letter is not an attempt to collect, assess, or recover 
a claim in violation of the Bankruptcy Code; and (2) if the 
debtor sends a check with the payment coupon, the Kay Law 
Firm will complete the payment by electronic debit and 
destroy the check.  (A041.)  
 
3
  The complaint, which was twice amended, included 
additional claims arising under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692f, 
1692g, 1692j, and 1692n.  However, Lesher moved for 
summary judgment as to his claims under §§ 1692e and g 
only.  The District Court granted summary judgment with 
respect to his § 1692e claim, but denied summary judgment 
with respect to his § 1692g claim.  Lesher decided not to 
pursue his remaining claims.  The only issue presently before 
this Court is whether the District Court erred in granting 
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 Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  Upon review, the District Court 
found that the January 11 and February 15, 2009 letters 
plainly implied that an attorney was involved in the 
collection, and implicitly threatened legal action, in violation 
of § 1692e.
4
  Viewing the letters from the perspective of the 
“least sophisticated debtor,” the District Court rejected the 
Kay Law Firm‟s contention that the disclaimers on the back 
of the letters mitigated the impression of potential legal 
action.  The District Court awarded Lesher $1,000 in 
damages.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). 
 
 The Kay Law Firm now appeals from the District 
Court‟s order.5   
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).  We 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We review a District Court‟s order granting summary 
                                                                                                     
summary judgment in Lesher‟s favor on his § 1692e claim.   
 
4
  The District Court did not specify whether it was finding a 
violation of § 1692e generally, or violations of subsections 
(3) or (5), or both.    
 
5
  The National Association of Retail Collection Attorneys 
(the “NARCA”) and the Association of Credit and Collection 
Professionals (the “ACA”) have submitted amici briefs in 
support of the Kay Law Firm‟s appeal.  
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judgment de novo.  EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 
F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
6
 
 
III.  Discussion 
 A.  FDCPA Background 
 Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 in response to 
the “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and 
unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692(a).  At that time, Congress was concerned that 
“[a]busive debt collection practices contribute to the number 
of personal bankruptcies, to material instability, to the loss of 
jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”  Id.  Congress 
explained that the purpose of the Act was not only to 
eliminate abusive debt collection practices, but also to “insure 
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”  Id. 
§ 1692(e).  After determining that the existing consumer 
protection laws were inadequate, id. § 1692(b), Congress 
gave consumers a private cause of action against debt 
collectors who fail to comply with the Act.  Id. § 1692k.   
 
Because the FDCPA is a remedial statute, we construe its 
language broadly so as to effect its purpose.  Brown v. Card 
Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, we analyze communications from 
lenders to debtors from the perspective of the “least 
                                              
 
6
  The District Court assumed that whether a communication 
is false and misleading under the FDCPA is a question of law, 
and neither party challenges this aspect of the District Court‟s 
decision on appeal.   
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sophisticated debtor.”  Id. at 454.  “The basic purpose of the 
least-sophisticated [debtor] standard is to ensure that the 
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the 
shrewd.  This standard is consistent with the norms that courts 
have traditionally applied in consumer-protection law.”  Id. at 
453 (quoting  Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d 
Cir. 1993)).  “„Laws are made to protect the trusting as well 
as the suspicious.‟”  Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (quoting Federal 
Trade Comm‟n v. Standard Educ. Soc‟y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 
(1937)). 
  
 Bearing this in mind, we note that although the “least 
sophisticated debtor” standard is a low standard, it “prevents 
liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of 
collection notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness 
and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness 
to read with care.”  Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 
350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  “Even the least sophisticated debtor is 
bound to read collection notices in their entirety.”  
Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 550 F.3d 294, 
299 (3d Cir. 2008) 
 
 B.  Section 1692e of the FDCPA 
 Lesher claims that the January 11 and February 15, 
2009 letters that he received from the Kay Law Firm violate 
section 1692e of the FDCPA, which prohibits the use of 
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1692e.  The sixteen subsections of section 1692e set forth a 
non-exhaustive list of practices that fall within this ban.  
These subsections include: 
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(3)   The false representation or implication that 
any individual is an attorney or that any 
communication is from an attorney. 
 
. . .  
 
(5)   The threat to take any action that cannot 
legally be taken or that is not intended to be 
taken. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  Because the list of the sixteen subsections 
is non-exhaustive, a debt collection practice can be a “false, 
deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of section 
1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections.  
See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 
 
 C.  Section 1692e Case Law  
 To determine whether the District Court properly 
construed section 1692e of the FDCPA, we look to both our 
own prior opinions, and to opinions from our sister circuits, 
discussing section 1692e of the FDCPA.  
  
 Although we have not had occasion to consider 
whether the precise type of debt-collection letters at issue in 
this case violates section 1692e,
7
 we have considered whether 
                                              
7
  The Kay Law Firm emphasizes that its January 11 and 
February 15, 2009 letters were “settlement letters,” not 
“dunning letters.”  While we recognize the distinction 
between letters that provide an opportunity for settlement in a 
conciliatory manner and those that contain more hostile 
demands for payment, we note that both types of 
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other debt-collection letters comply with this subsection of 
the Act.  For example, in Brown v. Card Service Center, 464 
F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2006), we considered whether a letter from 
a debt collection agency that warned the debtor of potential 
legal action violated section 1692e.  In that case, Card Service 
Center (“CSC”) sent the plaintiff a letter informing her that, 
unless she made arrangements to pay her debt within five 
days, the matter “could” result in referral of the account to 
CSC‟s attorney, and “could” result in “a legal suit being 
filed.”  Id. at 451-52.  The plaintiff sued, claiming that 
because CSC had no intention of referring her account to an 
attorney, and no intention of filing a law suit, the letter 
violated section 1692e‟s ban on false, misleading, or 
deceptive communications.  Id. at 452.  Specifically, Brown 
claimed that the letter violated subsection (5), which prohibits 
collection letters from “threat[ening] to take any action that 
cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).  The district court dismissed the 
complaint, determining that because “[t]he letter neither states 
nor implies that legal action is imminent, only that it is 
possible,” the plaintiff had failed to state a section 1692e(5) 
violation.  Id. at 454. 
  
 Upon review, we disagreed, and held that the facts 
alleged, if proven, could show that the CSC letter was 
“deceptive” or “misleading” under section 1692e because, in 
our view, it would be deceptive under the FDCPA for CSC 
“to assert that it could take an action that it had no intention 
                                                                                                     
communications must comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  See 
Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 299-300.   Therefore, we fail 
to see the significance in the distinction here.  
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of taking and has never or very rarely taken before.”  Id. at 
454-55 (emphasis in original).  
  
 More recently, this Court considered whether a 
collection letter falsely implied that it was from a lawyer in 
violation of section 1692e(3) because it was signed by the 
“Legal Department” of a collection agency even though none 
of the employees in that department were lawyers.  In that 
case, Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), 
Unifund sent a collection letter to the plaintiff demanding 
payment on a debt he owed to a third party.  Id. at 219.  The 
letter stated as follows: 
 
If we are unable to resolve this issue within 35 
days we may refer this matter to an attorney in 
your area for legal consideration.  If suit is filed 
and if judgment is rendered against you, we will 
collect payment utilizing all methods legally 
available to us, subject to your rights below . . .  
This communication is from a debt collector.  
This is an attempt to collect a debt . . . . 
 
Id. at 220.  The letter was signed by the “Unifund Legal 
Department,” which, despite its name, was comprised of 
solely non-lawyer employees.  Id.  Viewing the letter from 
the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor, we 
concluded that a debtor receiving the letter might reasonably 
infer that it was from an attorney even though it was not.  Id. 
at 223.  We rejected the idea that the statement that the letter 
was “from a debt collector” nullified the implication that the 
letter was from an attorney because, in our view, the 
categories of “debt collector” and “attorney” are not mutually 
exclusive.  Id.  We also disagreed with the district court‟s 
13 
 
conclusion that the letter could not reasonably be interpreted 
to be from an attorney because it stated that Unifund might 
refer the matter to an attorney; we noted that lawyers often 
refer cases to one another and that this aspect of the letter 
would not necessarily dispel the impression that the letter was 
sent by a lawyer employed in Unifund‟s legal department.  
Id.
8
    
 
 Several of our sister circuit courts have also analyzed 
the application of section 1692e to debt-collection letters 
from attorneys.  The leading case on whether mass-produced 
debt-collection mailings by an attorney violate the 
proscriptions of the FDCPA is Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 
1314 (2d Cir. 1993).  In Clomon, a debt collection agency 
mailed several form collection letters to the plaintiff that were 
printed on the attorney letterhead of the agency‟s general 
counsel, and bore the mechanically reproduced facsimile of 
                                              
8
  This Court‟s most recent opinion concerning section 1692e 
is Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 550 F.3d 
294 (3d Cir. 2008), in which we considered whether a 
collection agency violated section 1692e by sending out 
letters that were signed by the agency‟s executives even 
though none of those executives was personally involved in 
sending the letters.  Id. at 297.  We held that the letters, as a 
whole, were not deceptive under section 1692e because they 
did not objectively appear to be letters from a corporate 
executive to an individual; in our view, even the least 
sophisticated debtor, “possessing some common sense and a 
willingness to read the entire document with care, would not 
have believed that he had received a personal 
communication” from an executive.  Id. at 301.     
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his signature.  Id. at 1316.  Although the attorney approved 
the form of the letters, and the procedures according to which 
those letters were sent, the attorney had no direct personal 
involvement in the mailing of the letters.  Id. at 1317.  The 
letters contained a variety of threatening statements designed 
to induce the plaintiff to pay the amount she owed, such as 
the following: “After [this collection agency] reviews your 
collection file and previous correspondence sent you, I am 
suggesting we take the appropriate measures provided under 
the law to further implement the collection of your seriously 
past due account.”  Id.  
 
 The Second Circuit held that the use of the attorney‟s 
letterhead and his signature on the collection letters was 
sufficient to give the debtor the false impression that the 
letters were communications from an attorney in violation of 
§ 1692e(3).  Id. at 1320.  The Court held that the letters were 
false and misleading because they were not “from” the 
attorney in any meaningful sense of the word.  Id.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court found significant the fact 
that the attorney did not review each debtor‟s file, did not 
determine when particular letters should be sent, did not 
approve the sending of particular letters based upon the 
recommendations of others, did not see particular letters 
before they were sent, and did not know the identities of the 
persons to whom the letters were issued.  Id.; see also Miller 
v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 
2003) (explaining that “[a]lthough there is no dispute that [the 
defendant law firms] are law firms, or that the letters sent by 
those firms were „from‟ attorneys in the literal sense of that 
word, some degree of attorney involvement is required before 
a letter will be considered „from an attorney‟ within the 
meaning of the FDCPA”).  
15 
 
 The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion 
about a similar letter in Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 
1996).  There, as in Clomon, the plaintiff had received a 
series of mass-produced collection letters printed on the 
letterhead of a law office and including the mechanically 
reproduced signature of an attorney.  Id. at 225.  Several of 
the letters informed the plaintiff that, “[i]f payment is not 
received, a civil suit may be initiated against you by your 
creditor.”  Id.  Although the named attorney had approved the 
general form letter, he did not personally prepare, sign, or 
review any of the letters sent to the plaintiff; instead, a “legal 
assistant collector” actually produced the letter using training 
materials developed by the attorney.  Id.  The plaintiff 
claimed that these letters violated § 1692e(3) because the 
letters were not really “from an attorney.”  Id. at 229.  
   
 The Seventh Circuit agreed and held that an attorney 
sending a collection letter must be directly and personally 
involved in the mailing of the letters in order to comply with 
the strictures of the FDCPA.  Id.  The Court explained as 
follows: 
 
 An unsophisticated consumer, getting a letter from an 
  “attorney,” knows the price of poker has just gone up.   
 And that clearly is the reason why the dunning 
 campaign escalates from the collection agency, which   
might not strike fear in the heart of the 
consumer, to the attorney, who is better 
positioned to get the debtor‟s knees knocking.  
 
A letter from an attorney implies that a real 
lawyer, acting like a lawyer usually acts, 
directly controlled or supervised the process 
16 
 
through which the letter was sent.  That‟s the 
essence of the connotation that accompanies the 
title of “attorney.”  A debt collection letter on 
an attorney‟s letterhead conveys authority.  
Consumers are inclined to more quickly react to 
an attorney‟s threat than to one coming from a 
debt collection agency.  It is reasonable to 
believe that a dunning letter from an attorney 
threatening legal action will be more effective 
in collecting a debt than a letter from a 
collection agency.  The attorney letter implies 
that the attorney has reached a considered, 
professional judgment that the debtor is 
delinquent and is a candidate for legal action.  
And the letter also implies that the attorney has 
some personal involvement in the decision to 
send the letter.  Thus, if a debt collector 
(attorney or otherwise) wants to take advantage 
of the special connotation of the word 
“attorney” in the minds of delinquent consumer 
debtors to better effect collection of the debt, 
the debt collector should at least ensure that an 
attorney has become professionally involved in 
the debtor‟s file.  Any other result would 
sanction the wholesale licensing of an 
attorney‟s name for commercial purposes, in 
derogation of professional standards[.] 
 
Id. at 229; see also Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 635-
38 (7th Cir 2002) (relying on Avila to conclude that 
collection letters from defendant attorney violated § 1692e(3) 
and (10) because the attorney was not meaningfully involved 
in the decision to send the letters).   
17 
 
 The Second Circuit later clarified its holding in 
Clomon to explain that an attorney, acting as a debt collector, 
could avoid liability by including a clear and prominent 
disclaimer in the collection letter.  The collection letter at 
issue in that case, Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, LLP, 
412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005), was printed on the letterhead of 
“Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, LLP,” and stated in pertinent 
part as follows: 
 
The firm of Trauner, Cohen & Thomas is a law 
partnership representing financial institutions in 
the area of creditors rights.  In this regard, this 
office represents the above named BANK OF 
AMERICA who has placed this matter, in 
reference to an original account with [sic] for 
collection and such action as necessary to 
protect our client.  
 
At this time, no attorney with this firm has 
personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.  However, if 
you fail to contact this office, our client may 
consider additional remedies to recover the 
balance due.   
. . . 
 
Very truly yours,  
Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, LLP 
  
Id. at 361.  The plaintiff, relying on Clomon, claimed that 
Trauner, Cohen & Thomas had violated the FDCPA by 
sending a debt collection letter, signed by the law firm and on 
law firm stationary, thereby implying that the firm had 
18 
 
analyzed the debtor‟s case and rendered legal advice to the 
creditor when it had not.  Id. at 363.   
 
 The Second Circuit held that the letter did not violate 
the FDCPA because, unlike the letter at issue in Clomon, it 
included a clear disclaimer explaining the limited extent of 
the law firm‟s involvement in the collection action.  Id.  at 
364-65.  The Court elaborated on its previous holding as 
follows: 
 
One cannot, consistent with the FDCPA, 
mislead the debtor regarding meaningful 
“attorney” involvement in the debt collection 
process.  But it does not follow that attorneys 
may participate in this process only by 
providing actual legal services.  In fact, 
attorneys can participate in debt collection in 
any number of ways, without contravening the 
FDCPA so long as their status as attorneys is 
not misleading.  Put another way, our prior 
precedents demonstrate that an attorney can, in 
fact, send a debt collection letter without being 
meaningfully involved as an attorney within the 
collection process, so long as that letter includes 
disclaimers that should make clear even to the 
“least sophisticated consumer” that the law firm 
or attorney sending the letter is not, at the time 
of the letter‟s transmission, acting as an 
attorney.   
 
 Id. at 364 (emphasis in original).  Because the letter at issue 
in Greco included a disclaimer that, “[a]t this time, no 
attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular 
19 
 
circumstances of your account,” the Court concluded that the 
defendant law firm had not made a “false representation or 
implication that any individual is an attorney or that any 
communication is from an attorney with meaningful 
involvement as an attorney in the debtor‟s case.”  Id. at 365 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
     
 Notably, the Fifth Circuit recently considered the 
legality of a debt collection letter from the Kay Law Firm that 
appears to be the exact same form letter that was sent to 
Lesher on January 11, 2009.  In Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 
600 (5th Cir. 2009), the Kay Law Firm sent a collection letter 
to the plaintiff demanding payment of $448.97 on a consumer 
debt.  Id. at 601.  The letter, like the January 11, 2009 letter at 
issue here, was printed on the Kay Law Firm‟s letterhead.  Id. 
at 602.  The letter also contained the same language regarding 
the debtor‟s right to contest the debt, and included, on the 
back, the disclaimer that, “[a]t this point in time, no attorney 
with this firm has personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.”  Id.  The plaintiff brought 
suit under § 1692e, claiming that the letter was deceptive in 
that the Kay Law Firm “pretended to be a law firm with a 
lawyer handling collection of the Account when in fact no 
lawyer was handling the Account or actively handling the 
file.”  Id.  According to the plaintiff, the Kay Law Firm is not 
actually a law firm at all, but a debt collection agency that 
uses the imprimatur of a law firm to intimidate debtors into 
paying their debts.  Id. at 602-03. 
   
 Although the district court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Fifth 
Circuit held that dismissal was premature because the “least 
sophisticated debtor” might be deceived into thinking that a 
20 
 
lawyer was involved in the debt collection despite the 
disclaimer.  After reviewing the reasoning in (among other 
cases) Clomon, Rosenau, and Greco, the Court explained that, 
in its view, “the main difference between the cases is whether 
the letter included a clear, prominent, and conspicuous 
disclaimer that no lawyer was involved in the debt collection 
at that time.”  Id. at 606.  According to the Court:   
        
There are some letters that, as a matter of law, 
are not deceptive based on the language and 
placement of a disclaimer. At the other end of 
the spectrum, there are letters that are so 
deceptive and misleading as to violate the 
FDCPA as a matter of law, especially when 
they do not contain any disclaimer regarding the 
attorney‟s involvement.  In the middle, there are 
letters that include contradictory messages and 
therefore present closer calls. 
 
Id.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that this letter fell within the 
middle ground because, unlike the letter in Greco in which 
the disclaimer was part of the body of the text on the front 
page, the disclaimer here was on the back.  Id.  Thus, 
according to the Fifth Circuit, the least sophisticated debtor 
would not learn that the letter was from a debt collector 
unless he turned the letter over to read the “legalese” on the 
back.  Id. at 607.  Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter 
to the district court for further development of the record.  Id.  
In so doing, the Court added the following precautions to 
attorney-debt-collectors: 
 
We caution lawyers who send debt collection 
letters to state clearly, prominently, and 
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conspicuously that although the letter is from a 
lawyer, the lawyer is acting solely as a debt 
collector and not in any legal capacity when 
sending the letter.  The disclaimer must explain 
to even the least sophisticated consumer that 
lawyers may also be debt collectors and that the 
lawyer is operating only as a debt collector at 
that time.  Debt collectors acting solely as debt 
collectors must not send the message that a 
lawyer is involved, because this deceptively 
sends the message that the “price of poker has 
gone up.” 
 
Id. 
D.  Applying the Least Sophisticated Debtor Standard to 
the Kay Law Firm’s Letters 
 
 The District Court in this case relied on Brown, 
Rosenau, Greco, and Gonzalez to conclude that the Kay Law 
Firm‟s January 11 and February 15, 2009 letters were 
misleading under section 1692e of the FDCPA.  The District 
Court found that the least sophisticated debtor, upon receiving 
these letters, would believe that they had been sent  
by an attorney who might pursue legal action if he did not pay 
the debt.
9
  The District Court acknowledged that the letters 
                                              
9
  According to the District Court: 
 
A consumer is reasonably expected to believe 
that a law firm is comprised of attorneys and 
that it does legal work.  In the context of a 
consumer debt, a reasonable perception of 
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included a disclaimer notifying Lesher that an attorney had 
not reviewed his account, but found that the disclaimer did 
not mitigate the impression of potential legal action.  The Kay 
Law Firm now challenges the District Court‟s decision.10    
                                                                                                     
consumers is that if a consumer debt is being 
handled on behalf of the lender by a law firm 
and if the amount of money that the law firm is 
seeking (or some lesser settlement amount) is 
not paid, then the lawyer(s) will use the legal 
process with which they are familiar and for the 
use of which they are specifically trained to 
obtain a mandatory order of payment, which 
order will be enforceable by penalties within the 
power of courts to impose.  The implication that 
a communication to a consumer concerning a 
debt is from an attorney has a particular and 
well-known and well-understood effect.  That is 
explicitly recognized in and incorporated into § 
1692e. 
 
Lesher v. Law Office of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C., 724 F. Supp. 
2d 503, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010). 
 
10
  Specifically, the Kay Law Firm argues that, contrary to the 
District Court‟s conclusion, the letters: (a) complied with 
section 1692e(3) because they were indeed from an attorney; 
(b) complied with section 1692e(5) because they did not 
threaten legal action; and (c) were not otherwise “false, 
deceptive, or misleading.”  We need not reach the question of 
whether the Kay Law Firm‟s letters to Lesher violate sections 
1692e(3) and (5) because we conclude that they violate 
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 We agree with the District Court that the Kay Law 
Firm‟s letters violate section 1692e‟s general prohibition 
against “false, deceptive, or misleading” communications 
because they falsely imply that an attorney, acting as an 
attorney, is involved in collecting Lesher‟s debt.  In our view, 
the least sophisticated debtor, upon receiving these letters, 
may reasonably believe that an attorney has reviewed his file 
and has determined that he is a candidate for legal action.  We 
do not believe that such a reading would be “bizarre or 
idiosyncratic.”  Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354-55 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
   
 Nor do we believe that the disclaimers included in the 
letters, which are printed on the backs, make clear to the least 
sophisticated debtor that the Kay Law Firm is acting solely as 
a debt collector and not in any legal capacity in sending the 
letters.  First, in our view, the statement that “[a]t this point in 
time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the 
particular circumstances of your account” does little to clarify 
the Kay Law Firm‟s role in collecting the debt because it 
completely contradicts the message sent on the front of the 
letters—that the creditor retained a law firm to collect the 
debt.
11
  Moreover, as we noted in Rosenau, the statement that 
                                                                                                     
section 1692e‟s general prohibition against “false, deceptive, 
or misleading” communications. 
 
11
  We recognize that the Second Circuit held in Greco that 
the language in this disclaimer sufficiently explained the 
limited role that the attorneys played in collecting the 
plaintiff‟s debt.  See 412 F.3d at 366.  In viewing the Kay 
Law Firm letters at issue here, however, we are not convinced 
that this disclaimer, which—unlike in Greco—was printed on 
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the letters were “from a debt collector” is a statutorily 
required notification that “should not be viewed as nullifying 
any implication that the letter is from an attorney.”  See 539 
F.3d at 223 (explaining that “[b]oth common sense and case 
law confirm . . . that the categories of „debt collector‟ and 
„attorney‟ are not mutually exclusive”).  
 
 As the Seventh Circuit observed in Avila, “[a]n 
unsophisticated consumer, getting a letter from an „attorney,‟ 
knows the price of poker has just gone up.”  84 F.3d at 229.  
For this reason, we believe that it was misleading and 
deceptive for the Kay Law Firm to raise the specter of 
potential legal action by using its law firm title to collect a 
debt when the firm was not acting in its legal capacity when it 
sent the letters.  We need not decide whether an attorney 
debt-collector who sends out a collection letter on attorney 
letterhead might, under appropriate circumstances, comply 
with the strictures of the Act by including language that 
makes clear that the attorney was not, at the time of the 
letter‟s transmission, acting in any legal capacity.  The only 
question before us today is whether the Kay Law Firm‟s 
January 11 and February 15, 2009 letters to Lesher comply 
with the Act.  For the reasons set forth above, we hold that 
they do not.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
                                                                                                     
the back of the letters, effectively mitigated the impression of 
attorney involvement.  See Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607 
(distinguishing the letter in Greco from the Kay Law Firm‟s 
letter based on the position and context of the disclaimer).  
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 We will affirm the District Court‟s order granting 
summary judgment in Lesher‟s favor with respect to his 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e claim. 
1 
 
Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, P.C., et al.,  
No. 10-3194 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The sole question for us to answer in this appeal is 
whether the least sophisticated consumer, after reading the 
debt collection letters at issue, would believe that an attorney, 
acting as such, was involved in the collection process.  
Because I disagree with the Majority‟s conclusion and would 
hold that even the least sophisticated consumer would not be 
misled as the plaintiff and the Majority contend, I respectfully 
dissent.
1
 
 
 The least-sophisticated-consumer standard is meant to 
comport with the purpose of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to protect all consumers, “the 
gullible as well as the shrewd.”  Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 
                                              
1
 The case of Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 
2009), raised the same question with respect to a debt 
collection letter substantively indistinguishable from the letter 
at issue here.  The Honorable E. Grady Jolly dissented in that 
case, opining that the debt collection letter did not violate 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e.  Id. at 607-12 (Jolly, J. dissenting).  
Consistent with the reasoning in Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & 
Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005), Judge Jolly 
observed that the letter was best seen as sufficiently clear to 
tell the least sophisticated consumer that an attorney, acting in 
the role of an attorney, had not been involved in the collection 
effort.  Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607-09 (Jolly, J. dissenting).  I 
am persuaded by Judge Jolly‟s thoughtful analysis and 
endeavor to echo it here. 
2 
 
1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).  While the standard surely protects 
naïve consumers, it is also supposed to protect debt collectors 
by “prevent[ing] liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic 
interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient 
of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of 
understanding and willingness to read with care.”  Wilson v. 
Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  My 
colleagues in the Majority give this important aspect of the 
standard only a nod. 
 
 Under our precedents, attorneys are permitted to 
participate in debt collection, including the sending of debt 
collection letters, without running afoul of the FDCPA.  See 
Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(acknowledging attorney participation in debt collecting and 
discussing the FDCPA strictures on, not prohibition of, that 
participation); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (holding that an attorney acting as a debt collector 
violated the FDCPA by misstating the debtor‟s legal rights in 
the collection letter, not, implicitly, by merely sending the 
letter).  They must, however, tread carefully.  “Abuses by 
attorney debt collectors are more egregious than those of lay 
collectors because a consumer reacts with far more duress to 
an attorney‟s improper threat of legal action than to a debt 
collection agency committing the same practice.”  Crossley, 
868 F.2d at 570.  Indeed, because “[a] debt collection letter 
on an attorney‟s letterhead conveys authority and credibility,” 
there is inherent intimidation in correspondence of that kind.  
Id.   
 
 Consistent with that concern, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained that a debt 
3 
 
collection letter signed by a law firm or appearing on the 
firm‟s letterhead “implies – at least in the absence of 
language to the contrary – that the attorney signing the letter 
formed an opinion about how to manage the case of the 
debtor to whom the letter was sent,” Clomon, 988 F.2d at 
1321 (emphasis added), and thus, unless the attorney actually 
had formed a legal opinion, would violate the FDCPA‟s 
prohibition against “[t]he use of any false representation or 
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e (10).
2
  However, the Second Circuit has also 
                                              
2
 Section 1692e provides a non-exclusive list of 
conduct that violates that section.  Appellee argues that three 
of the examples of violative conduct listed in § 1692e are 
implicated here:   
(3) The false representation or implication that 
any individual is an attorney or that any 
communication is from an attorney. 
*** 
(5) The threat to take any action that cannot 
legally be taken or that is not intended to be 
taken.  
*** 
(10) The use of any false representation or 
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect 
any debt or to obtain information concerning a 
consumer. 
 
 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
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held in Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., that that 
implicit message of attorney involvement may be clarified by 
the use of proper disclaimers “connot[ing] far less actual 
attorney involvement [and thus] satisfying the FDCPA‟s 
requirements.”  412 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 2005).   
 
 For example, in Greco, the debtor claimed that a 
collection letter he received from a law firm left him with the 
false impression that an attorney had reviewed his account 
and formed an opinion regarding the debt.  Id. at 362.  This 
letter was printed on law firm stationary, and the firm‟s name 
was used as a signature.  Id. at 361.  The letter further implied 
the involvement of attorneys, referring to the creditor as “our 
client,” stating that the firm “represent[ed]” the creditor in 
“this matter,” and warning of “additional remedies.”  Id.  But 
the letter also contained the following disclaimer:  “At this 
time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the 
particular circumstances of your account.”  Id. 
 
 The Greco Court acknowledged the letter‟s 
implication that an attorney, acting as an attorney, had been 
involved, but the Court noted that “the implied level of 
attorney involvement is just that – implied.”  Id. at 364.  The 
implication could be overcome, the Court explained, by a 
clear disclaimer.  Id.  The Court concluded that the disclaimer 
at issue was clear enough for the least sophisticated consumer 
to understand that no one involved in the debt collection to 
that point had had “meaningful involvement as an attorney.”  
Id. at 365.  In summary, the Second Circuit held: 
 
[A]n attorney can, in fact, send a debt collection 
letter without being meaningfully involved as 
an attorney within the collection process, so 
5 
 
long as that letter includes disclaimers that 
should make clear even to the “least 
sophisticated consumer” that the law firm or 
attorney sending the letter is not, at the time of 
the letter‟s transmission, acting as an attorney. 
 
Id. at 364.   
 
 In Gonzalez v. Kay, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit faced essentially the same question faced 
by the Second Circuit in Greco.  The collection letter‟s 
content, including its disclaimer regarding attorney 
involvement, tracked that of the Greco letter.
3
    Gonzalez, 
557 F.3d at 602.  However, the panel majority in Gonzalez 
concluded that the letter was misleading because, unlike the 
letter in Greco, which had the disclaimer on the front, the 
disclaimer was on the back of the letter.  Id. at 606.  The 
Gonzalez majority further opined that the disclaimer was 
“legalese” and inconsistent with the implicit message 
communicated by the law firm‟s letterhead on the front of the 
page.  Id. at 607.   
 
The dissent in Gonzalez, however, pointed out that the 
disclaimer “[did] not contain a single legal term” and that a 
“reasonable unsophisticated consumer, whom we assume can 
read, could not possibly have trouble understanding it.”  Id. at 
608 (Jolly, J., dissenting).  The dissent further noted that the 
majority‟s concern over the placement of the disclaimer could 
                                              
3
 The disclaimer read: “At this point in time, no 
attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.”  Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 602. 
6 
 
only provide a meaningful basis for reaching a different result 
than in Greco if one assumes “that an unsophisticated 
consumer would not turn the letter over,”  id. at 608-609, 
which was an untenable assumption given the large notice on 
the letter‟s front page stating:  “Notice: Please see reverse 
side for important information,” id. at 609.  As rightly put by 
the dissent, “[W]hen a prominent instruction in the body of 
the letter warns that there is important information on the 
reverse side, a reasonable reader, even if unsophisticated, 
would turn the paper over and read the back.”  Id. at 609 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, read in its entirety, 
the letter could not confuse the least sophisticated consumer 
regarding an attorney‟s involvement.  Id. 
 
 The Gonzalez dissent is exactly correct, and I regret 
that I too am required to dissent rather than be part of a 
majority opinion recognizing that the words “least 
sophisticated” do not mean “illiterate” or “completely 
irresponsible.”  The correspondence at issue here features 
basically the same plain language disclaimer as was at issue 
in both Greco and Gonzalez:  “At this time, no attorney with 
this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances 
of your account.”  (App. at 41, 43.)  Without legal mumbo 
jumbo, that disclaimer tells any reasonable reader, including 
the least sophisticated, that, “while this was a letter from a 
law firm, no attorney had specifically examined the 
recipient‟s account information, and hence no attorney had 
yet recommended filing a lawsuit against the creditor.”  
Greco, 412 F.3d at 362-63.  Moreover, like the letter in 
Gonzalez, the letter here does not mention “clients,” 
“representation,” or “other jargon suggesting lawyer 
involvement.”  Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 608 (Jolly, J., 
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dissenting).  Thus, it is “significantly less suggestive of 
attorney involvement” than the Greco letter.  Id. 
 
Once upon a time, we held that, “[a]lthough 
established to ease the lot of the naïve, the [least sophisticated 
consumer] standard does not go so far as to provide solace to 
the willfully blind or non-observant.  Even the least 
sophisticated debtor is bound to read collection notices in 
their entirety.”  Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 
Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2008).  We have strayed far 
from that ruling today.  To say that the least sophisticated 
consumer would not flip the page to read the entire letter, 
particularly when prompted to do so by a conspicuous notice 
on the front of the letter, or to say that one could be confused 
about the level of attorney involvement despite the plain 
statement that no legal review had occurred, is to permit – 
indeed to encourage – the kind of “bizarre or idiosyncratic 
interpretation[] of collection notices,” id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted), we have previously condemned.  “Rulings 
that ignore these rational characteristics of even the least 
sophisticated debtor and instead rely on unrealistic and 
fanciful interpretations of collection communications” 
frustrate the express purpose of the FDCPA to “„insure that 
those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.‟”  
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). 
 
 Although the Majority claims to eschew deciding 
whether a law firm can ever be clear enough in a disclaimer 
to overcome the effect of sending out a debt collection notice 
on law firm letterhead, the practical effect here is clear.  Law 
firms take an extraordinary risk in sending a collection letter, 
no matter how conciliatory or how plain their prose. 
